Sprint 1: a 700 MB asset that survives a refresh

Sprint 1 (9 to 22 November 2026) had one measurable goal: a 700 MB model asset downloads in Chrome, survives a page refresh in the middle of the download, and is evicted cleanly when the storage quota is hit. This note is written from the four tester reports (T1 browser proofs, T2 Rust and interop gates, T3 release gate, S1 security review) and quotes no figure that is not in them.

Every number below was measured on an Apple-silicon development machine (18 cores, Google Chrome 157.0.8103.38 driven by Playwright 1.65.0, Node 22.22.3) and is a placeholder; the reference 8 GB Windows laptop without a GPU has not been measured yet.

What shipped

The 700 MB proofs

T1 ran the runtime demo page against the repository's synthetic range server (test/browser/range-server.mjs), which generates the asset bytes from a seeded xorshift64* stream so no large file is stored anywhere. A separate Node script (test/tools/asset-digest.mjs big 734003200) computed the expected SHA-256 of the same stream independently of the browser code: 0f0664c252212d3be1f6b783b42b8e3507ab9b218984dd25b52a2be561a9db35, in 0.85 s.

Scenario Store Result Measurement (Apple-silicon placeholder)
Full download of 734,003,200 bytes, SHA-256 verified against the independent digest OPFS pass 4060 ms wall, 180.8 MB/s, peak JS heap 2,793,500 bytes
Same IndexedDB pass 2561 ms wall, 286.6 MB/s, peak JS heap 2,795,400 bytes
Reload the page mid-download, then call ensure() again OPFS pass 276,824,064 bytes written at reload (37.7%); exactly one request after the reload, Range: bytes=276824064- with If-Range carrying the server's strong ETag, answered 206 with 457,179,136 bytes, which is the size minus the start; final hash matches; no part file left
Same IndexedDB pass 285,212,672 bytes written at reload (38.9%); one request Range: bytes=285212672-, 206, 448,790,528 bytes sent; resume leg 2805 ms including the reload
Server with --corrupt-hash OPFS pass ensure() rejects with hash_mismatch, asset.verify.failed emitted, no index row, no committed file, no part file; getBlob() rejects with not_verified
Server with --ignore-range on a resume OPFS pass one request answered 200 with all 734,003,200 bytes; asset.download.restarted with reason status-200; final hash verified
Committed file truncated by one byte OPFS pass getBlob() rejects with not_verified, the index row is removed, asset.verify.failed reason size_changed
Manifest entry pointing at another origin both pass blocked with policy and asset.download.blocked before any request; the server log for it is empty
Network egress across every scenario both pass the union of the page's requests and the server log contains only 127.0.0.1 URLs: the demo page's own files, /manifest.json and /assets/*

Peak JS heap stays near 2.8 MB because the manager streams 8 MiB chunks straight into the store; the figure does not include the OPFS or IndexedDB buffers held by the browser process. The capability probe (detectCapabilities()) resolved well inside the 2 s budget (147 ms test wall time including the page round trip) and its details object carries only the allow-listed keys.

What did not pass in round one

The third clause of the sprint goal, "evicts cleanly when the storage quota is hit", failed in T1's first run and is the reason the sprint was not closed on the first pass.

Security review

S1 found no Critical or High issue, one Medium (the manifest schema's algorithm enumeration leaves no room for agility) and twelve Low items, all assigned to the fix round, and wrote the threat model, findings register and pre-pilot checklist under runtime/docs/security/. The accepted risks are on the record with target sprints: no key revocation, no transparency log, no Sigstore compatibility, a single-signature threshold, trust in the browser clock for expiresAt, same-origin co-tenant trust for OPFS, and the unmeasured IndexedDB fallback on the 8 GB laptop. T3's release gate found every CI action pinned by full commit SHA and matching the published tag refs, per-job permissions everywhere, no pull_request_target, no secrets, and zero hits in the clean-room sweep across all seven repositories.

pagetriage v1.0.0 was not tagged

The plan asked for pagetriage to be "release-ready for the v1.0 tag" this sprint. It is not, and nobody tagged it. docs/release.md lists the seven definition-of-done items; T3 verified every row against the repository and found only row 3 (README limitations section) Done. Rows 1 (tests first and CI green on Linux, macOS and Windows: the Windows job has never run because nothing has been pushed to the organisation yet), 2 (benchmark on the 8 GB laptop), 4 (signed artefacts and manifest: no key exists), 5 (changelog and semver tag), 6 (installable from a clean machine: nothing is on crates.io, PyPI or npm) and 7 (write-up) are Open. The version stays 0.1.0, the 1.0.0 notes live under Unreleased in the changelog, and the owner has not been handed a tag to approve. T3's recommendation was either to close rows 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 and then tag 1.0.0, or to tag an explicitly pre-release 0.9.0 whose notes name the Open rows.

What is next

Sprint 2 brings the glyphsift Devanagari validator and its corruption benchmark, the first real backend adapters behind the backend-adapter contract, and the deferred runtime hardening (cross-tab orphan race, IndexedDB file-size trust, the acquire refcount gap). The 8 GB Windows laptop measurements, the real-quota IndexedDB eviction behaviour and every Windows CI run wait for the owner's first push and the laptop itself; until then every figure on this site stays labelled as a placeholder.

Evidence for every statement above is in the tester reports and their artefacts (download and resume JSON reports, Playwright traces, server request logs, gate logs). Prose on this page is CC BY 4.0; attribute "Airplane Mode Labs" with a link.