runtime demo

Everything runs in this tab. Nothing is uploaded; the only network requests are for this page's own files and for a manifest URL you paste yourself.

?. The Pages build is .github/workflows/pages.yml. See also the backend demo. Store: ?. Manifest source: ?. Quota source: ?.

Sprint 5 (18 Nov 2026): Working: runtime beta 0.3.0-beta.0 on spec release 0.5.0: capability profile, signed-manifest verification (now with an expected-id check that refuses a validly signed manifest of another product), download, hash check and quota eviction of synthetic assets, resume, and a Tamper lab of fourteen cases that shows the exact refusal reason, with 0 requests after a manifest refusal. The test-model page adds embeddings through the worker host, in-worker hashing of every model file, a token budget and Stop. This page's policy is now connect-src 'self': it can only reach its own origin. Not yet: WebLLM (cut), Windows and 8 GB measurements (not measured on 8 GB), key revocation, a real signing key.

Browser requirements

  • ? WebAssembly
  • ? OPFS (navigator.storage.getDirectory, secure context)
  • ? IndexedDB
  • ? Web Locks (navigator.locks)
  • ? WebCrypto Ed25519 (crypto.subtle present; actual Ed25519 support is reported from the first verify)
  • ? WebGPU (optional, used by the capability profile only)

All Airplane Mode Labs demos share one browser origin (airplanemode-labs.github.io): storage, quota, estimate() and persist() are shared between them. This demo writes only under airplanemode-runtime.

Tested in Google Chrome. Firefox and Safari are not tested this sprint.

What this demo does not do yet

  • No model is downloaded. The three assets are synthetic xorshift64* byte streams of 12, 8 and 6 MiB, generated at build time; they prove download, resume, hashing and eviction, not inference.
  • Inference is not part of this page: the backend demo (models.html) detects your device tier and, only after you click, downloads a small test model and answers a prompt on WebGPU or WebAssembly. The assets here stay synthetic.
  • The fixture manifest carries no expiresAt and is signed by a key generated for this build only, so it proves the verification path, not a publisher identity.
  • No key revocation, transparency log or Sigstore (security finding S1-001).
  • Not yet: WebLLM (cut; revisit after the 8 GB measurement), Windows and 8 GB no-GPU measurements (not measured on 8 GB), revocation of a signing key, a real signing key.
  • This page can reach only its own origin (Content-Security-Policy connect-src 'self', a Sprint 5 change): a manifest URL on another origin is refused in plain words before any request, because this origin also hosts the dockit demo's models.
  • The Tamper lab runs the vectors of manifest spec v0.1 against a trust set of two RFC 8032 public test keys that exists only inside the lab. It shows the refusals the spec publishes; it does not make a manifest trustworthy, and a real deployment's trust root is application configuration.
  • Chrome's real IndexedDB quota is unmeasured here; use the test quota field to see eviction. Chrome under-reports IndexedDB usage in estimate().
  • Resume after an interrupted download is verified on the local Range server and on GitHub Pages (checked 9 Nov 2026: Range: bytes=0-1023 on the fixture answered 206 with Accept-Ranges: bytes). If a host ever answers 200 instead of 206, the download restarts from zero and is still hash-verified.
  • No service worker: offline after the first load is best effort (Chrome's HTTP cache), not guaranteed.

Settings

Changing the store reloads the page with ?store=.

Test hooks (window.__runtime) exist only on 127.0.0.1 / localhost; a hosted page never exposes them.

Capability profile

detectCapabilities(): allow-listed device facts (cores, memory tier, storage estimate, WebGPU adapter vendor and limits, WASM features). Never reads navigator.userAgent.


      

Manifest verification

Manifest URL: ?. Trust root for this build: ? (keyId = sha256 of the raw Ed25519 public key).


      

Tamper lab

Each button runs the real verifier (or, for the two asset cases, the real asset manager) over bytes copied verbatim from spec/vectors/tamper and spec/vectors/tamper-assets (manifest spec v0.1 published in runtime/spec (committed; public after the owner's push)). The verdict, reason code, per-signature reasons and stage are what the library returns. Every case runs at the vectors' clock (2026-11-14), on its own in-memory state and a fresh in-memory store: nothing here touches this page's trust roots or its persistent storage.

RFC 8032 public test keys: demo only; allowTestKeys is false by default in the library

Case Run Verdict Reason Signatures Stage Details
Changed entry byte
one hex digit of an entry's sha256 changed after signing
Changed size
an entry's size plus one, after signing
Changed signature
one bit of the signature flipped
Swapped key
key id and public key of key 2 over a signature made by key 1
Public key mismatch
the key id names key 1, the embedded public key is key 2
Untrusted key
validly signed by key 2, which is not in the trust set
Truncated file
the signed file cut at half its length
Rollback
version 1.0.0, validly signed, after 1.1.0 was accepted in the lab's own state
Expired
expiresAt 2026-11-10, before the vectors' clock
Non-canonical signature
S replaced by S + L, still 64 bytes
Asset byte flip
a valid manifest; one byte of the 4096-byte asset flipped
Asset truncated
a valid manifest; the asset is one byte short
Valid manifest
the unmodified base manifest: accepted
Manifest for another product
a validly signed manifest whose id is not the one this page expects: refused before the downgrade state is read

Download, resume, verify

Each row drives one manifest entry through the asset manager: ensure() downloads in 1 MiB chunks into a partial file, hashes while streaming and commits only when the SHA-256 matches; getBlob() returns the verified bytes.

off

This is a simulation: the page wraps fetch and cuts the response body after N bytes of the first attempt, so ensure() fails with a network error. The next ensure() reads the partial file and asks the server for the rest with a Range header, which this page shows. A real refresh in the middle of a download resumes the same way.

Entry Size Progress Resumed from Actions
Load and verify a manifest first.

No Range header sent yet.


      

Storage

Only this demo's prefix is listed or touched: the OPFS directory airplanemode-runtime/ and the IndexedDB database airplanemode-runtime.


      

Quota and eviction

Without a test quota the manager plans against navigator.storage.estimate() with the production headroom of 67108864 bytes (64 MiB). The walkthrough sets a 24 MiB test quota and 1 MiB headroom, downloads demo-a (12 MiB) and demo-b (8 MiB), then demo-c (6 MiB): 20 + 6 + 1 exceeds 24, so the least recently used entry is evicted.


      

Paste your own manifest URL

This page can only reach its own origin: its Content-Security-Policy is connect-src 'self'. A URL from another origin is refused in plain words, with AssetError code policy, before any request is made, so nothing is fetched. The manifest must verify against one of the trust roots.


      

Events

airplanemode.event/0.1 records from the manager's in-memory ring buffer. They never leave the page.